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Policy makers have long turned to vehicle regulation for addressing public concerns about 
transportation's energy and environmental impacts. This paradigm is ratified in recent action to raise 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and issue vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions standards both in California and federally. At the same time, U.S. policy makers are 
moving toward a national program to limit GHG emissions economy wide. The most robust 
strategy entails capping emissions from all major sectors including transportation. Such a policy 
would place an overall constraint on the dominant, carbon dioxide (CO2) portion of vehicle GHG 
emissions, which are also regulated by vehicle standards. This overlap raises questions of how 
vehicle-specific regulations should relate to the broader policy and what metric vehicle standards 
should use in such a context.  
Answers can be found by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of past policies and drawing on 
recent discussions regarding the design of national climate policy. One conclusion is that climate 
policy should require agencies to administer vehicle standards as part of an overall transportation 
sector GHG management plan that explicitly considers the costs and benefits of the standards 
relative to other measures that affect emissions. Another is that vehicle standards should be based 
on an energy metric rather than on GHG emissions rates, which depend on the fuel supply system 
and not just the vehicle itself. In general, vehicle standards should be promulgated as part of a policy 
structure that provides appropriate incentives for all actors in the sector: fuel suppliers, 
transportation infrastructure and land-use planners, consumers and vehicle manufacturers. Such an 
approach will ensure balanced and ongoing progress in limiting transportation emissions in a 
manner reasonably commensurate with national climate protection goals, such as those defined by a 




Regulations have been a mainstay of public policy for addressing societal impacts affected by vehicle 
design since the first automotive air pollution standards were authorized by California's Motor 
Vehicle Pollution Control Act in 1960. Safety standards were instituted with the passage of major 
road safety legislation in 1966. The Clean Air Act required nationwide limits on tailpipe pollution 
starting in 1975 (CAA 1970). Following the 1973 oil embargo, the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards as a way to control oil demand 
(EPCA 1975). Taking effect for cars in 1978 and light trucks in 1979, CAFE standards required a 
roughly 63 percent improvement by 1985 for the overall light duty fleet relative to its 1975 level of 
15.3 mpg, or an average improvement rate of 5 percent per year (EPA 2008).  
Many policy makers see vehicle fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards as 
crucial for addressing the transportation portion of the global warming problem. For the auto 
industry and many economists, however, vehicle regulation is not an obvious tool for controlling 
GHG emissions. Their preferred solutions are taxing carbon or using a cap-and-trade system to put 
a price on carbon throughout the economy. From an environmental perspective, a cap-and-trade 
approach has the advantage of constraining emissions while maximizing flexibility and cost-
effectiveness (Stavins 2008). If vehicle standards remain in place, economic efficiency gains can be 
realized if the regulations are integrated into the cap-and-trade regime (Ellerman et al. 2006).  
Transportation Emissions and Regulation 
Transportation accounts for 28 percent of the total GHG inventory in the United States and is, after 
industrial energy use, the second-largest end-use source (EPA 2007). Therefore, it is essential to 
include transportation in any comprehensive national climate program. A cap-based design 
confronts the dispersed nature of transportation emissions, which come from millions of individual 
vehicle tailpipes. Directly regulating GHG emissions from consumers’ vehicles is not workable 
(House E&C 2007).  
Some analysts suggest using a "sectoral hybrid" strategy (Nordhaus & Danish 2003). In this case, 
cap-and-trade covers major stationary sources and transportation is handled with vehicle efficiency 
standards. Similarly, the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) addresses power 
generation and industrial sources. The EU addresses transportation through a combination of 
voluntary vehicle CO2 standards and pricing policies, including high fuel and vehicle taxes. Without 
transportation under the cap, however, this strategy does not assure the integrity of economy-wide 
emissions limits.  
Most U.S. cap-and-trade proposals require that transportation fuel suppliers submit allowances to 
cover the CO2 emitted from the use of fossil-derived fuels that they sell. Transportation emissions 
are therefore covered indirectly based on fuel chemical characteristics, which are readily measured. 
This approach is seen in bills dating from the McCain-Lieberman proposal of 2003 through the 
Waxman-Markey bill that passed the House in June 2009 (ACESA 2009) and Senate bills under 
discussion as of this writing. California authorized a cap-and-trade system in its Global Warming 
Solutions Act (AB 32, 2006). The state's draft regulation proposes to place transportation fuels 
under the cap starting in 2015 (CARB 2009). All of these policies assume that vehicle standards are 
already in place.  
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The tailpipe CO2 emissions covered by cap-and-trade are the same as those addressed by vehicle 
regulations, including both CAFE standards and GHG emissions standards such as California's 
Pavley rules (AB 1493, 2002) and newly proposed federal rules (EPA & DOT 2009). Environmental 
advocates believe that vehicle standards leverage the technology change needed for reducing 
emissions (ASE et al. 2002; Sierra Club 1991, 2005). Others believe that if the objective is to reduce 
total fuel use and emissions, fuel and carbon taxes or a carbon cap are more cost effective (Portney 
et al. 2003).  
 At this point vehicle standards are a fait accompli. For light duty vehicles, the single national program 
announced by the Obama Administration on May 19, 2009, is in place for model years 2012 to 2016 
(White House 2009a). This program entails a ramp-up of stringency similar to that called for by 
California's Pavley standards. For fuel economy, it amounts to a four-year advance approaching the 
35 miles per gallon (mpg) combined fleet target that EISA (2007) had required by 2020. Moreover, 
authority for direct regulation of motor vehicles is unlikely to be superseded by climate policy. 
Pending climate legislation is either silent on the matter or extends authority to vehicle classes not 
regulated historically. California policymakers are starting to plan for post-2016 Pavley standards, 
identifying hypothetical levels for analytic purposes (CARB 2008a).  
Regulatory Coordination Questions 
To date, vehicle standards have been developed independently of GHG targets, being set instead 
through engineering and economic studies of how much fuel economy gain can be accomplished 
over a given time frame (Greene & DeCicco 2000; NRC 1992, 2002). Such studies use a technology 
assessment rather than an economic efficiency framework, and are not quantitatively tied to the 
emissions limitations needed to meet climate targets. Neither have fuel economy rules been formally 
driven by quantitative energy conservation or petroleum reduction goals, even for the original CAFE 
standards that required a near doubling of automobile fuel economy over ten years (DOT & EPA 
1974). Interestingly, however, an aspirational goal of saving two million barrels per day figured 
prominently in the Congressional deliberations that led to the original CAFE standards (Nivola 
1986, Chapter 5).  
Going forward, the issue is whether future motor vehicle standards, promulgated after a national 
climate policy is in place, should be coordinated relative to economy-wide GHG targets. Questions 
include how the effort required by vehicle regulation relates to that for other parts of the 
transportation system, such as fuels, travel demand and other modes; how it relates to the level of 
effort in other sectors of the economy; and what metric is best for administering vehicle standards 
within a broader climate policy.   
A CLIMATE POLICY FRAMEWORK 
To successfully confront a problem as vast as global warming, it is necessary to evaluate numerous 
GHG reduction measures in terms of how well they collectively limit emissions to climate protective 
targets. As stated by the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee:  
The climate change program must be an economy-wide program that accounts for 
all greenhouse gas emissions in the United States because (1) dramatic emissions 
reductions are required; (2) many economic sectors contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions; and (3) everyone must fairly share responsibility for reductions. An 
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economy-wide climate change program does not mean, however, that all sectors 
contribute their fair share in the same way. (House E&C 2007, 3)  
As climate strategy advances, policy makers increasingly see merit in setting GHG emissions caps at 
national or regional levels and using emissions trading as a way to balance environmental 
effectiveness with economic efficiency.  
Cap-and-trade enables the creation of an international system for tracking GHG emissions 
allowances. It minimizes costs through trading within and among capped nations and the use of 
emissions credits earned by uncapped countries or sectors (Jorgenson et al. 2008). Incentives to 
reduce emissions are thereby extended to sources that otherwise would be unregulated. Only cap-
and-trade moves economies toward a uniform, cross-jurisdictional price on carbon, because markets 
linked through emissions trade will gravitate toward a common price if the trading rules are 
transparent (Rühl 2009).  
For domestic policy, a cap-and-trade system ties together the elements of what is otherwise a 
piecemeal strategy. The cap establishes a well-defined limit on the GHG emissions inventory, 
providing an anchor for other parts of the policy and linking economic sectors together in a legally 
enforceable manner. Through such a framework, policy makers can have reasonable confidence that 
the GHG inventory will stay within the bounds necessary for climate protection (EDF 2007).  
Pros and Cons of Cap-and-Trade for Transportation 
As a leading transportation energy analyst notes, creating an economy-wide price signal is considered 
"the essential cornerstone of a meaningful climate change strategy" (Greene 2007). However, a cap 
alone is not sufficient for transportation. Greene (2007) also states, "other policies will be needed in 
addition to a cap-and-trade system in order to make the reductions in GHG emissions that are likely 
to be necessary" for addressing the sector. This view builds on the rationale for vehicle efficiency 
regulation that exists apart from climate concerns. Technologies that increase fuel economy face 
market barriers that a carbon price signal is unlikely to overcome because consumers do not fully 
value fuel savings over a vehicle's lifetime (Greene & Shafer 2003; Greene et al. 2009). One reason is 
that fuel represents a relatively small share of total vehicle ownership costs (von Hippel and Levi 
1983).  
Some analysts conclude that cap-and-trade is not useful for the sector (German 2007; Sperling & 
Yeh 2009). Indeed, it has been called a "nonsolution" for transportation, the argument being that  
… until biofuels and electric and hydrogen vehicles become commercially viable … 
it is better to focus on more direct forcing mechanisms, such as a low-carbon fuel 
standard for refiners, coupled with fuel and greenhouse gas standards for vehicle 
makers and incentives and rules to reduce driving. (Sperling & Gordon 2009, 149)  
Nordhaus and Danish (2003) conclude that cap-and-trade is the best design overall, but because it 
poorly handles transportation, they propose a sectoral hybrid approach that omits transportation 
fuels from the cap and relies instead on vehicle efficiency standards as the primary means of 
controlling GHG emissions from the sector.  
Other analysts view vehicle standards as a complement to, rather than replacement for, including 
transportation within a cap-and-trade system. The Energy and Commerce Committee wrote:  
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If refiners and importers are designated as the "point of regulation" for the 
transportation sector in the cap-and-trade program, a comprehensive climate change 
program will also regulate motor vehicle manufacturers through efficiency or other 
performance standards for vehicles. (House E&C 2007, 13)  
In addition, that paper said that climate policy should involve all parties that contribute to emissions 
from the sector, with a design that treats vehicles and fuels as a system and addresses consumer 
demand.  
Structure of Transportation Markets 
The insufficiency of simply putting fuels under the cap can be understood by a close look at the 
markets comprising the sector. It is not just the fuels market that underpins transportation GHG 
emissions. The "three-legged stool" analogy reflects how emissions are a product of factors, rather 
than a sum of terms. These three factors are vehicle usage, vehicle fuel consumption rate and fuel 
carbon intensity. The result is a "factorization dilemma," meaning that the GHG inventory for each 
major mode of transportation cannot be subdivided in a manner that assigns unique shares of 
emissions to the sector's key actors.  
Figure 1 shows the market structure for the automotive subsector. The emissions come from 
vehicles operated by consumers, shown in the middle of the triangle. The points of the triangle 
correspond to the sector's other major actors, whose financial transactions with consumers define 
the distinct but interlinked markets that influence emissions:  
 Consumers purchase vehicles from automakers.  
 Consumers buy motor fuel from fuel suppliers, now mainly the petroleum industry.  
 Consumers purchase roads, parking, land and its associated uses and land-use patterns 
through taxes, user fees and in the price of many bundled services of the built environment 
from the array of public and private entities that provide transportation infrastructures, plus 
urban and regional plans that underpin travel demand.  
The distinct markets that influence transportation emissions can be seen as cash flows from 
consumers or other system users who are the source of demand to the suppliers of transportation-
related products and services. Analogous structures exist for other transportation subsectors.  
No one price-quantity relationship captures the decision making that determines transportation 
emissions. Neither can a simple, single market model adequately inform policy design for integrating 
the sector into a carbon market. A complex set of different but interlinked markets defines the way 
actual decisions are made. It is not reducible to the market for motor fuel, although fuel suppliers 
are the actors best suited to serve as the point of regulation for cap-and-trade.  
A complete market-based policy needs to reckon with all of these relationships. Focusing on only 
one, such as the fuel market price-quantity response or the auto market fuel economy response, risks 
an imbalanced and ineffective policy. Because the vehicle, fuel and travel demand markets are so 
different, one cannot expect to easily levelize costs of carbon reduction among them, let alone 




The above concepts buttress recommendations made by the U.S. Climate Action Partnership 
(USCAP), a coalition of corporations that includes diversified industrial firms, automakers, oil 
companies, utilities and other businesses as well as several environmental groups. USCAP's (2009) 
Blueprint for Legislative Action outlines a framework that includes a cap-and-trade program plus cost-
containment measures and complementary policies. For transportation, it recommends a systematic 
approach in which responsibility for limiting emissions is shared among fuel suppliers, vehicle 
manufacturers, consumers and public officials who plan and manage infrastructure and land use (see 
Table 1).  
Although fuel suppliers are the point of regulation, the principle of shared responsibility implies that 
they serve in an accounting capacity on behalf of all actors in the sector. Vehicle standards are a 
mechanism by which automakers do their share, but as for other measures in a capped sector, 
efficiency standards are not expected to significantly decrease CO2 emissions below the level set by 
the cap. As Table 1 indicates, other measures needed to control transportation energy use and 
thereby limit demand for allowances include policies to reduce GHG-intensive travel and improve 
system efficiency.  
USCAP also recommends fuel-related performance standards in addition to including fuels in the 
cap. A low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) has been proposed for this purpose (Hwang 2009; Sperling 
& Yeh 2009). Such an approach is used in California, with the state's LCFS designed to mesh with 
its vehicle GHG emissions standards. A purely market-based approach for addressing uncapped 
emissions and motivating fuel technology change has also been proposed (DeCicco 2009).  
Figure 1.  Actors in the interlinked markets that determine automotive sector 




The item most pertinent to the question of how to coordinate vehicle standards with the broader 
climate program is USCAP's recommendation for an overall transportation sector GHG 
management policy. Such a provision would require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT) and other federal agencies to assess progress in controlling 
GHG emissions from the sector, examining contributions from vehicle efficiency, fuels, consumer 
demand, infrastructure and other transportation systems, and update their policies as needed to keep 
the sector on track.  
TYING TARGETS TO SOCIETAL NEEDS 
This last recommendation suggests a formal public process for tying vehicle standards to national 
GHG mitigation goals specified by cap-and-trade legislation. Even without a legislated cap, standard 
setting could be guided by administrative goals, such as the Obama Administration's targets of 17 
percent below 2005 levels by 2020 ramping down to 83 percent below by 2050 (White House 
2009b). Note that this linkage does not imply that vehicle standards have the same targets as an 
economy-wide program; it only means that the national targets should be formally factored into the 
standard setting process.  
Exactly how such a linkage can be made has not been determined to date. California's Pavley 
standards were set before the statewide climate policy was enacted. Those targets, plus the EISA-
dictated CAFE levels, defined the negotiating space in which the White House compromise was 
struck in May 2009, without any formal tie to national GHG targets.  
"The need of the nation to conserve energy" 
EPCA requires CAFE standards to be set at the maximum feasible level based on four 
considerations: technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other standards of the 
government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation to conserve energy (EPA & DOT 2009). 
Program administration has, however, varied greatly, from the Carter Administration’s rapid increase 
Table 1.  Elements of the USCAP Approach for Transportation Climate Policy 
 
 Transportation Fuels in the Cap 
 Fuel suppliers submit allowances to cover 
fossil-based CO2 emitted from transportation 
fuel use by consumers and other end users 
 Point of regulation at the refinery gate and 
importers of refined products 
 Transparency of the carbon price signal to 
end users 
 Fair and equitable allocation of allowance 
value for addressing carbon price impacts 
on transportation fuel consumers  
Complementary Measures 
 Fuel-related GHG performance standards 
 Vehicle-related GHG performance standards 
 Policies to reduce carbon-intensive travel, 
educate consumers and improve system 
efficiency 
 Overall transportation sector GHG 
management policy 
 Technology transformation programs for the 
sector, including RD&D for advanced low-
carbon vehicles and fuels 
A crosscutting recommendation is that local, state, regional and federal programs should be 
complementary, aiming to achieve compatibility and avoiding conflicts that might drive up 
compliance costs and make it more difficult to achieve environmental goals.  
Source: USCAP (2009), pp. 6-7, 12-13, 16, 21-23.  
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in light truck standards to the Reagan Administration’s rollbacks of car standards. It is difficult to 
see how purely objective assessments of the first three statutory considerations could result in such 
widely different outcomes unless their application was itself guided by differing subjective views of 
the need to conserve energy.  
Aside from the initial near doubling of passenger car fuel economy mandated by EPCA, Congress 
has not made a firm commitment on limiting U.S. transportation energy use. The many failed 
attempts to move stronger standards through Congress and the appropriations riders that prevented 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) from raising CAFE standards 
demonstrate this reluctance. Legally, the recent CAFE increases can be seen as just another transient 
response to political pressures of the time, in contrast to a well-defined, long-term commitment such 
as a carbon cap might provide.  
EPCA and EISA do not provide rigorous guidance for determining societal need, even though 
EISA strengthened some economic analysis requirements. The CAFE program lacks "any statutorily 
prescribed formula for balancing the factors" that go into standard setting (EPA & DOT 2009: 
49463). NHTSA has broad discretion in how to interpret the law when determining the "maximum 
feasible" fuel economy levels required for a future model year. Challenges to CAFE rules were rarely 
upheld by the courts until the notable Ninth Circuit Court decision in 2007, which remanded the 
model year 2008-11 light truck rule to NHTSA for reconsideration. Among the reasons cited was 
the agency's failure to monetize CO2 emissions when setting the standards (Ninth Circuit 2007).  
Clean Air Act Lessons 
EPCA's lack of specificity for evaluating "the need of the nation to conserve energy" when setting 
CAFE standards contrasts with the administrative approach in the Clean Air Act (CAA). The act 
requires attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which are in turn 
scientifically determined based on the impacts of air pollution on public health and welfare. This 
formal linkage is essential because the long, ongoing quest for clean air has driven successive rounds 
of emissions standards for all major sources of air pollution, including motor vehicles. The results 
can be seen in Figure 2, which compares the reduction of total conventional pollutants from U.S. 
light duty vehicles with the lack of progress in reducing fuel use over the past 35 years.  
Bottom-up, engineering assessments are a major part of the regulatory process for developing 
vehicle emissions standards. Questions of technological feasibility and cost loom large, involving 
lively debates regarding what is possible over a given time frame and at what cost. Regulated 
industrial firms, such as automakers, are understandably cautious about environmental investments 
because they are rewarded poorly in the private market. Conversely, environmental advocates and 
officials representing regions with strong support for clean air, such as California, are optimistic 
about the ability to improve technology at an acceptable cost. Ongoing "clean air wars" have 
reflected this dynamic (Doyle 2000).  
The CAA legal foundation has been critical for achieving the absolute reductions in environmental 
impact seen in Figure 2. As long as areas were not in attainment, public officials were obligated to 
cut emissions further, leading to tighter inventory targets for criteria pollutants and their precursors. 
Specific regulatory requirements for meeting these targets were then apportioned among major 
sources based on technical and economic considerations.  
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This process balances the concerns and capabilities of different industrial and regional stakeholders. 
An instructive example is the EPA-led effort to help the Northeast with ozone attainment in the 
face of interstate nitrogen oxide (NOx) transport. The resulting recommendations by the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group led to stricter standards for vehicles and fuels, power plants, industrial 
boilers and other sources (OTAG 1997). This process of basing source-specific standards on 
scientifically determined inventory targets is seen in the EPA-mandated revisions to State 
Implementation Plans (the "NOx SIP call"), the Tier 2 and heavy-duty diesel programs and related 
regulations, the health benefits of which are still accruing today.  
Seen in this light, it is not the simple analogy of vehicle GHG emissions standards to emissions 
standards for controlling criteria pollutants that is most relevant for climate policy, even though that 
analogy may have had tactical value for leveraging climate action broadly and vehicle regulation in 
particular. Rather, it is the core CAA paradigm of attainment and the administrative process it 
entails. Such a requirement is a missing link in the energy policy embodied in EPCA's guidelines for 
the CAFE program and the way those guidelines are mimicked in California's AB 1493 law. 
Technology and economic assessments can be argued to greater or lesser levels of stringency, but by 
themselves lack a legal link to quantitative environmental requirements.  
As administered to date, vehicle efficiency and GHG emissions standards answer only the question 
of "how much can we do," rather than the more critical question of "how much must we do" to meet 
a societal goal. The Clean Air Act works because it compels an ongoing effort to do what must be 
done to protect public health and welfare. Recognizing the importance of this foundation, most 
Figure 2.   Trends in Total Fuel Consumption and Conventional Air Pollution for 
U.S. Cars and Light Trucks, 1970-2005 
 
Source:  Derived by author using total nationwide fuel use and emissions levels (not per-mile rates) from 
U.S. DOT and EPA data; the air pollution index is based on a health damage cost weighting of 
tailpipe nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOC), particulate matter (PM10), 
carbon monoxide (CO) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).  
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climate legislation is crafted to build on the Clean Air Act, preserving its core enforceability 
provisions, while specifying a sequence of GHG emission limits though the cap, which plays the role 
for climate protection that the NAAQS do for air quality.  
Toward Carbon Management for Transportation 
The national climate policy proposals of 2009 do not ensure that the authorities affecting 
transportation limit GHG emissions to levels low enough to meet the cap. ACESA does not address 
light duty CAFE and GHG emissions standards, providing for no coordination with the bill's cap-
and-trade program. Most new measures authorized, such as GHG standards for heavy vehicles and 
alternative fuel promotions, are given in Titles I and II of the bill without a link to Title III, which 
sets the cap. The energy efficiency and clean energy provisions for other sectors are similarly 
disconnected from the cap. In California, although the first round of AB 1493 standards was 
promulgated before the statewide climate policy established by AB 32, the goals of latter legislation 
are being applied as the state develops additional policies and updated measures under its scoping 
plan (CARB 2008b). Thus, the state is moving toward a cross-sectoral GHG management framework 
that will presumably include future rounds of motor vehicle GHG standards.  
The closest connection federally is ACESA's transportation system efficiency provision. This section 
of the bill requires DOT to "establish national transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction goals" plus procedures for evaluating targets for achieving those goals. The sector goals 
are to be set at levels "commensurate with the emissions reductions goals" given by the legislation's 
economy-wide global warming provisions (ACESA 2009). The bill also requires DOT to assess 
progress in reducing transportation GHG emissions at least every six years. It does not, however, 
require an administrative process to modify the programs if the sector fails to make adequate 
progress. Thus, this proposed GHG policy differs from the CAA transportation conformity 
provisions, which require state and local transportation plans to demonstrate consistency with air 
quality goals before federal project funding is approved (FHWA 2005).  
Some might argue that weak administration of complementary measures does not matter if a cap is 
in place because the carbon price will rise enough to bring emissions into line. However, real-world 
complexities -- including the actual structure of transportation markets as illustrated in Figure 1 -- 
dictate that climate policy include carefully crafted sets of measures addressing sector-specific 
concerns and many other issues. If lack of progress in a major sector such as transportation causes 
very high carbon prices, the overall program could be jeopardized. It might trigger provisions that 
allow emissions to exceed the cap or provoke a political backlash that eviscerates the policy. 
Therefore, measures to limit transportation energy demand must be administered to ensure adequate 
progress relative to other measures both within and across sectors.  
The transportation sector GHG management policy suggested by the USCAP Blueprint provides 
such a coordination mechanism:  
Congress should require EPA, in collaboration with the Department of 
Transportation and other federal and state and local agencies, to carry out a periodic 
in-depth assessment of current and projected progress in transportation sector GHG 
emissions reductions…This assessment should examine the contributions … 
attributable to improvements in vehicle efficiency and GHG performance of 
transportation fuels, increased efficiency in utilizing the transportation infrastructure, 
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as well as changes in consumer demand and use of transportation systems, and any 
other GHG-related transportation policies enacted by Congress. (USCAP 2009, 23) 
The results of this assessment should be applied to modify policies as needed to ensure sufficient 
progress, without a need to go back to Congress:  
On the basis of such assessments EPA, DOT and other agencies with authorities 
and responsibilities for elements of the transportation sector should be required to 
promulgate updated programs and rules—including revisions to any authorized 
market incentives, performance standards, and other policies and measures—as 
needed to ensure that the transportation sector is making a reasonably 
commensurate contribution to the achievement of national GHG emissions targets. 
(USCAP 2009, 23) 
The resulting linkage between complementary measures such as vehicle standards and economy-
wide goals provides a coordination mechanism now absent from climate policy as proposed to date.  
This approach offers protections for regulated parties such as automakers. It does not create a new 
expectation for increasingly more stringent vehicle standards; the authority to raise standards already 
exists under EISA and the Clean Air Act. What it means instead is that standards would no longer 
be developed in isolation from other measures. Agencies could use an OTAG-like process, with 
stakeholders able to air their concerns and guide the analysis used to update not only vehicle 
standards, but all sector policies affecting GHG emissions. If the cap itself—perhaps amplified by 
incentives that reward measured as opposed to projected realization of low net carbon vehicle-fuel 
systems—begins to accelerate progress in limiting transportation emissions, then further increases in 
vehicle standards may become unnecessary.  
WHAT METRIC FOR VEHICLE STANDARDS? 
Two metrics are now in use: 1) fuel economy measured in miles per gallon as used for CAFE 
standards; and 2) GHG emissions rate measured in grams of CO2-equivalent emissions per mile as 
used by CARB and proposed by EPA. The EPA & DOT (2009) proposed rule notes that the vast 
majority of CO2 emissions from vehicles are related to fuel economy because they are proportional 
to fuel consumption. Most reductions under vehicle GHG standards come from fuel-related CO2, 
the exceptions being halocarbons from air-conditioning systems and small amounts of methane and 
nitrous oxide. These trace gases, which comprise about five percent of total vehicle GHG emissions, 
would need to be specially handled in any case, as discussed by CARB and EPA.  
In considering the metric for vehicle regulation,  the actors diagram of  Figure 1  is a useful point of 
reference. A policy should motivate parties according to aspects they most directly control. Vehicle 
standards target automakers, but automakers do not control the processes associated with producing 
fuel. Automakers can develop vehicles that use any given fuel more efficiently. Therefore, a metric 
for energy rather than emissions, such as fuel efficiency or consumption rate, makes the most sense. 
This view is corroborated in the USCAP Blueprint, which, in reference to CAFE, states:  
These vehicle fuel economy programs have a scope and structure that are consistent 
with the need for complementary measures for on-road vehicles, as stated in the Call 
for Action, and can serve as the basis for such measures going forward. (USCAP 
2009, 22) 
Thus, fuel economy standards are now supported by a wide range of stakeholders.  
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Problems with GHG Emissions Rates for Vehicle Standards 
Vehicle GHG emissions rates can be evaluated on an end-use ("tailpipe") basis or on a lifecycle 
("well-to-wheels") basis. An end-use basis misses the emissions associated with supplying fuel. For a 
zero emissions vehicle (ZEV) such as a battery electric or hydrogen fuel cell car, essentially all 
impacts occur upstream during fuel production and distribution. Rating such vehicles as having zero 
GHG emissions is misleading and provides no incentive for efficiency. A direct basis is also 
problematic for biofuels if the "renewability shortcut," which excludes CO2 emissions from biogenic 
carbon, is used (DeCicco 2009).  
For these reasons, GHG standards are commonly defined on a lifecycle, or "carbon footprint," 
basis. Compliance relies on CO2-equivalent gram-per-mile (gCO2e/mi) results from lifecycle analysis 
(LCA) models that account for vehicle use-phase emissions (and therefore fuel economy) plus fuel 
supply-phase emissions. Notably, vehicle supply-phase (manufacturing) emissions are not included 
in vehicle GHG standards as proposed to date, even though the regulated parties (automakers) 
arguably have more control over emissions from the production of their product than they do over 
the emissions associated with the production of fuel.  
A vehicle's GHG emissions rate is not a well-defined attribute of the vehicle itself. Although it has 
taken on great familiarity from the voluminous well-to-wheels analyses over the years, the gCO2e/mi 
metric is an abstraction based on the joint characteristics of an assumed vehicle-fuel system. Unlike 
fuel economy or vehicle emissions as traditionally regulated, it cannot be measured using repeatable, 
objective tests of a given vehicle. Fuel lifecycle assumptions must be introduced and these 
assumptions have a very large impact on the results.  
Another rationale for vehicle GHG emissions standards is that they provide a technology-forcing 
mechanism for alternative vehicle-fuel systems. The belief that alternatives will solve transportation 
energy problems has long motivated policies to promote alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), which fuel 
lifecycle analyses suggest are capable of deep reductions in emissions. Although numerous federal 
and state AFV and ZEV mandates and programs have been pursued over the years, none have had a 
measurably transformative impact (McNutt & Rodgers 2004). Nevertheless, hope springs eternal for 
policies that seek to change the car in order to change the fuel, as seen in the current enthusiasm for 
plug-in hybrids like the Chevy Volt. Vehicle GHG standards expand this paradigm, embedding 
assumptions about the promise of alternative fuels (whether liquid, gaseous or electricity) in 
standards that regulate vehicles.  
Vehicle focused-policies cannot affect fuel availability or infrastructure (Viera 2009). Neither do they 
affect fuel supply and the upstream processes that dominate the impacts of many alternative fuels. 
Moreover, it is not clear that reducing fuel GHG intensity requires changing fuel chemistry. 
Attempting to use vehicle policies to force changes in transportation energy supply may turn out to 
be as ill-advised over the decades ahead as it has been ineffectual over the decades past.  
Energy-Based Metrics 
A vehicle regulatory metric based on energy entails the fewest assumptions and avoids confounding 
attributes of the vehicle with those of the fuel supply system. Energy-related impacts, such as 
demand for GHG emissions allowances, scale with fuel consumption, and so vehicle energy use rate 
(e.g., Btu per mile) is an ideal metric. It can be directly measured for any vehicle, including dual-fuel 
vehicles or plug-in hybrids, based on repeatable tests.  
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While fuel consumption rate might be ideal, a fuel economy metric could be reformed to avoid its 
existing distortions based on assumptions about particular fuels. CAFE has used regulatory 
parameters related to petroleum use and other special assumptions such as those for dual-fuel 
vehicle credits. The planned phase-out of those credits is helpful in moving to a well-specified 
metric that will stand the test of time. An energy-based metric maintains a clean division of labor 
between the regulated parties on the demand side of the market, such as automakers, and 
transportation fuel providers on the supply side.  
Much recent effort by CARB and EPA has gone into defining GHG emissions standards for 
vehicles. The Supreme Court (2007) found no conflict in having both GHG and CAFE standards in 
place. Although complicated, the overlapping regulation is administratively workable, as discussed by 
EPA & DOT (2009). This does not mean, however, that dual regulation of vehicles for both fuel 
economy and GHG emissions is the best long-term approach for policy.  
Compared with an energy-based metric, a GHG metric introduces numerous problems and no clear 
benefits. GHG emissions standards were advanced for tactical reasons to overcome automakers' 
strong objections to raising CAFE standards. It may well be that it is politically important to 
preserve such leverage. However, if a mechanism -- such as the overall sector GHG management 
policy described above -- is put in place to ensure coordination of standards with national GHG 
reduction goals, then these tactical considerations may become less important.  
Handling Fuel Cycle Emissions 
What an energy-based vehicle metric leaves unaddressed is the upstream portion of fuel cycle GHG 
emissions, which are incorporated into a vehicle GHG emissions standard using fuel LCA modeling. 
These upstream emissions are under the control of actors in the fuel supply chain, who should be 
directly targeted in order to carbon-constrain or otherwise provide an incentive to reduce their 
emissions. Such fuels-industry oriented mechanisms would be among the set of measures assessed 
under the overall transportation sector GHG management policy suggested here. This paper's focus 
on vehicle-oriented policy should not be interpreted to mean that an equal focus is not needed on 
climate policy targeting transportation fuels; it is worth highlighting this issue as one in need of 
much more careful attention than it has received to date.  
Some concerns raised above in arguing against lifecycle GHG emissions standards for vehicles also 
apply to lifecycle standards for fuels (such as an LCFS). The idea of fuel lifecycle regulation was 
perhaps first published by DeCicco & Lynd (1997), who suggested extending conventional fuel 
composition standards to "standards specifying a maximum full-fuel-cycle GHG factor (for 
example, in grams of carbon-equivalent per joule of energy content)." As the notion of carbon 
footprint became commonplace, an LCFS found support by some policymakers, as in California, 
and related academic circles (Sperling & Yeh 2009). The problem is that the abstract concept of 
carbon footprint -- in this case fuel lifecycle GHG intensity -- corresponds poorly to the concrete 
realities of fuel supply systems. An LCFS is product-specific rather than source-specific, but 
chemically identical products can have GHG intensities that vary greatly based on the actual (as 
opposed to modeled) emissions in their supply chain. A source-specific approach anchored in cap-
and-trade would be more effective as long as all fuel-related emissions are either under the cap or 
accounted for by mechanisms tied to the cap (DeCicco 2009). The "actor"-based analysis paradigm 
presented here might be useful for examining how best to handle transportation fuels in a climate 




Vehicle standards are an essential part of climate policy because they target decisions in the auto 
market, an important determinant of transportation GHG emissions. Although standards have been 
based on fuel economy (CAFE) or GHG emissions rates (CARB and EPA rules), neither approach 
now includes a mechanism that ties the regulations into a broader climate policy framework such as 
cap-and-trade.  
A lesson from the success of the Clean Air Act is that a formal linkage to a well-defined national 
goal is crucial for ongoing progress. This legal framework is more important than the resemblance 
of GHG emissions standards to conventional emissions standards. Linkage can be achieved through 
an overall transportation GHG management policy that binds the administration of vehicle 
standards and other sector programs to national climate protection goals. It would entail requiring 
agencies that oversee aspects of the transportation system to assess progress in reducing emissions 
and to update their policies as needed to ensure that the sector progresses along a path that is 
reasonably consistent with the economy-wide GHG targets and timetable.  
For specifying vehicle standards as part of a broader climate policy, an energy-based metric makes 
the most sense. This conclusion is reached for several reasons: vehicle efficiency is a factor that 
automakers can influence, while they have little influence on fuel supply or the fuel production 
processes that determine fuel GHG intensity; unlike fuel GHG intensity, vehicle energy 
consumption and fuel economy can be measured unambiguously; and because efficiency-based 
reductions of fuel demand are important for limiting GHG emissions under a cap.  
A focus on energy end-use for vehicle standards leaves fuel-cycle GHG emissions to be addressed 
by other means. It will be necessary to have a strong policy for fuels, ideally anchored by having 
transportation fuels under the cap but with additional mechanisms as needed to ensure the integrity 
of GHG accounting. How best to specify fuels-oriented mechanisms within a climate policy 
framework remains a topic for future work; the actors-based analytic paradigm described above is 
likely to be useful in that regard. Assessing progress in reducing fuel-cycle emissions and updating 
the fuels-oriented mechanisms accordingly will be one of the tasks involved in implementing the 
overall transportation sector GHG management policy suggested here.  
Further analysis and discussion are needed regarding how to implement such a policy, which needs 
to consider the structure of the multiple markets that affect transportation emissions. Nevertheless, 
the challenges involved are similar to those of conventional air quality management, if not indeed 
technically more straightforward. The successful approach that federal and state agencies have taken 
in balancing the costs and benefits of various air pollution control strategies serves as a model for an 
effective transportation sector GHG management policy. Such a policy would enable more stable 
and evenhanded administration of vehicle standards than seen historically as stringency varied with 
the politics of the day. It would harmonize the level of effort on vehicle regulation with the levels of 
effort on fuels and travel demand as well as on other sectors of the economy. The resulting 
framework will create a stronger and more equitable climate policy for both transportation and the 
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